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I. INTRODUCTION
Ms. Jane Doe raised the fluted glass to her lips and took a sip of the
champagne. After all, it was New Year's Eve and she was only going to
take a sip or two. How could one little sip cause any harm to the baby she
carried, she thought rhetorically. A few moments later the doorbell chimed.
It was the police. She was informed that the telemetry device clipped to
her cervix at her first prenatal visit months ago alerted the computer at
the hospital that it detected a sudden increase in her blood alcohol level.
Thus, by law, she would have to accompany the police to the hospital for
further testing. The officer also advised her to bring her personal items
since she may be required to be detoxified prior to discharge from the
hospital.
If this scenario seems improbable in a kindler and gentler America,
think again. The medical technology required to evaluate the blood pres-
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sure, pulse rate, and oxygen saturation of the blood is currently available
and can be found in the form of a small pressure pad attached to the
handlebar of expensive home exercise equipment. Miniature transmitting
devices (telemetry) have been relaying biophysical information from our
astronauts for two decades. The legal framework necessary to incarcerate
a woman over the conduct in her pregnancy has been in operation in
some jurisdictions for at least the last few years.1 Women have been jailed
for failing to follow medical advice 2, alcohol abuse3 and drug addiction.4
Recent advances in medical technology, which allow physicians to mon-
1 In re Ruiz, 27 Ohio Misc. 2d 31, 500 N.E.2d 935 (C. P. Wood Co. 1986). In
this case, the trial court held that a "viable" fetus is a "child" under the child
abuse statute, OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.031 (Pages 1990), and harm to it
caused by the mother's prenatal use of heroin may be considered child abuse.
However, in a subsequent case which involved a woman in her seventh month of
pregnancy who had failed twenty-three drug screenings during her pregnancy,
the juvenile court held that it had no jurisdiction to regulate the conduct of a
pregnant adult for the purpose of protecting the health of her unborn child. Cox
v. Franklin City, 42 Ohio App. 3d 171 (C. P. Franklin Co. 1988). The court dis-
tinguished this case from In re Ruiz, where the child had been born and juris-
diction was appropriate. Cox, 42 Ohio App. 3d at 174.
2 Chambers, Dead Baby's Mother Faces Criminal Charges On Acts in Preg-
nancy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,1986, at A10, col. 1. This article describes the criminal
action taken against Pamela Rae Stewart Monson by the state of California. She
was charged with child abuse for willful disregard of medical advice, namely, to
discontinue amphetamine use, abstain from sexual intercourse because her pla-
centa was in an abnormal position, and to seek medical care if vaginal bleeding
reoccurred. She allegedly took drugs, had sex and delayed coming to the hospital.
She gave birth to a term infant who died, apparently of brain damage. The charges
were brought even though there was not enough evidence to show that her conduct
was causally related to the tragic outcome. The charges were eventually dis-
missed, mainly because they were brought under an inappropriate statute, that
is, one that was intended to enforce child support. The inclusion of a fetus within
the definition of a child was aimed at husbands who abandon their pregnant
wives. Interestingly, although it was alleged that Ms. Monson engaged in sexual
intercourse, no charges were brought against her spouse. Id. See also Comment,
A New Crime, Fetal Neglect: State Intervention to protect the Unborn - Protection
at What Cost?, 24 CAL. W.L. REV. 161, 168-69 & n.65 (1988).
3 See Case Against Pregnant Woman is Dismissed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990,
A10, col. 3 (an account of the dismissal of a felony charge against a woman whose
blood alcohol level was elevated at about four months duration of her pregnancy
- a time when a woman could electively terminate the pregnancy without inter-
ference by the state); see also Rickhoff, Protecting the Fetus from Maternal Drug
and Alcohol Abuse: A Proposal for Texas, 21 ST. MARY'S L. J. 259 (1989).
4 See Lewin, Drug Use During Pregnancy: New Issue For the Courts, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 5, which describes the case, among others, of
Jennifer Johnson, who was charged with delivering controlled substances (co-
caine) to a minor. The prosecutor advanced the novel theory that a woman could
be convicted of delivering a controlled substance to a minor if the fetus, after
birth but still attached to its mother by its umbilical cord, is a "child" under
Florida Law. The Judge stated, "I am convinced and find that a child that is born
but whose umbilical cord has not been severed is a 'person' within the intent and
meaning of the Florida Statute 893.13(1)(c)1." Florida v. Johnson No. E89-890-
CFA, slip op. (Fla. July 13, 1989) (Jennifer Johnson was sentenced to fifteen years
probation.).
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itor, diagnose and treat problems during fetal development and birth,
create a perception that a fetus is an individual patient with needs distinct
from its mother.5 Logically, this perspective will eventually lead to con-
flicts between the mother and her fetus. In fact, the current approach in
the area of medical jurisprudence which embodies state regulation of
reproductive health frames this issue in terms of a mother's right to
physical autonomy versus a fetus' right to physical integrity.6 This ap-
proach has virtually ignored the nature of the physician-patient rela-
tionship in this quandary, as well as the therapeutic alliance created in
this unique association. 7 When so-called maternal-fetal conflicts are ex-
amined from the perspective of the physician-patient relationship, it be-
comes obvious that the characterization of these conflicts is illegitimate",
counterproductive, 9 and leads to an impermissible legislative intrusion
into the medical decision-making process.'0
The physician-patient relationship is substantially influenced by issues
involving ethics, morality, law, and politics. Throughout this article, the
nexus between law and medicine will be emphasized. Perhaps the most
important of these associations is the relationship between principles,
duties and rights. Justice Holmes aptly stated that since no rights were
absolute, they were poor tools for analysis in any case because they were
not truly fundamental considerations.1' "Duties precede rights logically
and chronologically."12 Holmes eventually came to view "duties" as de-
rivative notions and thought that it was essential to understand the
principles at work, not the moral sounding labels attached to the results. 13
5 See Note, Developments - Medical Technology and the Law. Ill. State Inter-
vention During Pregnancy, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1557 (1990) [hereinafter Note,
Developments].
Note, Rethinking (M)Otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of
Pregnancy, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1325 (1990) (hereinafter Note, Rethinking Moth-
erhood).
I A tragic example of this occurred in the case, In Re A.C., 539 A.2d 203 (D.C.
App. 1987), reh'g granted, 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990). In this case, the legal
department at George Washington University Hospital initiated a court action,
arguably perceived to be in the best interests of the unborn fetus, which sought
to compel a pregnant patient with terminal cancer to undergo Cesarian section.
This action was taken against the wishes of the patient, her family, and her
physicians. Treating physicians testified in a hearing at the hospital that the
chances for the fetus were grim, that the patient would probably not recover from
the surgery and "the department as a whole" wanted to abide by the wishes of
the family. The judge ordered the surgery; the extremely premature infant died
about two hours afterward and the mother died two days later. The death cer-
tificate listed the cesarian section as a contributing cause of her death. Id.
See Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 6, at 1326.
Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminali-
zation of 'Fetal Abuse,' 101 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1988).
10 See supra notes 5, 6 & 9; Note, The Criminalization of Maternal Conduct
During Pregnancy: A Decisionmaking Model For Lawyers, 64 IND. L. J. 357 (1989);
Gallagher, Prenatal v. Parental Rights: What a Difference an "A" Makes, 21 ST.
MARYTs L. J. 301 (1989).
"Novick, Justice Holmes and Roe v. Wade, 25 TRIAL 58, 59 (December 1989).
12 Id. at 59 citing Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of Laws, 5 AM. L. REV.
1, 3 (1870).
13 Id.
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Consistent with this reasoning, this article will explore the nature of the
ethical and legal foundations of the physician-patient relationship and
its most important principle, the doctrine of informed consent. In addition,
it will review the constitutional legitimacy of the relationship, the duties
imposed upon it, which rights, if any, flow to the mother and the fetus,
and how these principles interact with the physician's role in so-called
maternal-fetal conflicts. 14
The ultimate question is whether the state can formulate a compelling
interest in overruling the autonomy of the individual patient, in this case,
a pregnant woman. The entire area of reproductive technology, prenatal
care, and the approach to the fetus is affected by this issue, and this
analysis should provide a clearer understanding of the physician's med-
ical and legal role in such controversies.
II. THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP IN GENERAL
A. The Creation of a Duty of Care
At two places in the Hippocratic Oath a fundamental moral principle,
termed the Hippocratic principle, is stated. The physician acknowledges,
"'I will apply ... measures for the benefit of the sick according to my
ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice.' "5 This
principle underscores two distinct duties: to promote the welfare of the
patient and to protect them from harm and injustice. Primum non nocere,
the latinized maxim for, "first, do no harm" has also come to represent a
physician's duty of care.' 6 The ancient Greek physicians couched this
doctrine in a collection of clinical observations and occasional therapeutic
remarks as they made their rounds or "epidemia."'1 7 The passage con-
taining this aphorism is left unexplained and reads:
Declare the past, diagnose the present, foretell the future; prac-
tice these acts. As to diseases, make a habit of two things to
help, or at least do no harm. The art has three factors, the
disease, the patient, the physician. The physician is servant of
the art. The patient must cooperate with the physician in com-
batting the disease.'8
14 Incidentally, the traditional approach to the obstetrical patient may be at
the crux of this discord, suggesting that such conflicts may be iatrogenic, that is,
caused by the physician. Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some Special
Problems, 9 W. N. ENG. L. REv. 67 (1987) (hereinafter Informed Consent); Brody
& Thompson, The Maximin Strategy in Obstetrics, 12 J. FAM. PRAC. 977 (1981).
'5 Veatch, A Theory of Medical Ethics: The Hippocratic Tradition, in LAw,
SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 273-74 (1984).
16 Id. Although modern proponents, especially "pre-life" advocates in the abor-
tion debate, have attempted to give a priority of "avoiding harm" over the "benefit
to the patient," no such priority exists in the passage itself nor was one followed.
17 Jonsen, Do No Harm, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 99,100 (2d ed 1983).
11 Id. citing JONES, HIPPOCRATES I 165 (1923). Cf. Jonsen, Do No Harm, in
Philosophical Medical Ethics: Its Nature and Significance, in 3 PHILOsOPHY AND
MEDICINE SERIES 27-41 (Sprickler ed. 1977).
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Although unexplained, there are three clear concepts that "flow" from
this passage. A physician's duty of care is to help, or at least do no harm.
Second, the duty develops from a cooperative physician-patient relation-
ship. Finally, the duty is not finite, that is, it extends over a continuum
which examines the past (history), functions in the present (illness), and
considers the future (prognosis). Incidentally, pregnancy was generally
not treated by the ancient Greek physicians since they believed it was
beneath their dignity. Obstetrical care was the province of the midwives,
including the use of abortificants. 19
B. The Physician-Patient Relationship
The nature of the relationship is unique. 20 It is a consensual one based
on mutuality of contract. "At the heart of a contract is informed consent
rather than blind trust; a contractual understanding of the therapeutic
relationship encourages full respect for the dignity of the patient, who
has not, because of illness, forfeited his sovereignty as a human being."
21
Thus, this contract instills a covenant of compassion and faithfulness into
the relationship.22
Legally, the relationship is characteristic of a fiduciary one where one
party has superior knowledge or skill (doctor) in which the other (patient)
voluntarily entrusts her care. The physician-patient relationship is a
fiduciary one whose policy is to promote a full and free disclosure of all
information by the patient to her treating physician. 23 Consistent with a
cooperative relationship, the law recognizes that this information flows
in both directions. 24 Thus, it is the fiduciary nature of the relationship
which creates a legal duty to pursue the relationship in good faith and
candor, that is, to fully inform the patient in the undertaking and main-
tain confidentiality.
" SPEERT, Chapter 3: The Midwives, in ICONOGRAPHIA GYNIATRICA: A PICTORIAL
HISTORY OF GYNECOLOGY AND OBsTETRIcs (1973).20 Brody, The Physician-Patient Contract: Legal and Ethical Aspects, 4 J. LEGAL
MED. 25 (1976).
21 May, Code and Covenant or Philanthropy and Contract?, in MORAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE 92 (2d ed. 1983). This essay was originally published in 5 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 25-38 (1975).
Bleich, Compassion in Medicine: Toward New Definitions and New Insti-
tutions, 295 N. ENG. J. MED. 939 (1976).
23Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio 1965),
motion denied, 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
Ott v. Weinstock, 444 N.E.2d 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)(Because of the fi-
duciary nature of physician-patient relationship, the physician has a duty to
disclose material information to the patient. Failure to do so results in fraudulent
concealment but the duty to disclose ends when physician-patient relationship is
terminated.). See also Jordan v. Sinai Hosp. of Detroit, Inc., 171 Mich. App. 328,
429 N.W.2d 891 (1988) (physician's fiduciary duty to his patient precludes any
ex parte conferences with his patient's adversary) citing MICH. STAT. ANN. §§
2.302(B)(1)(b), 2.310, 2.314(A)(1)(b), (B)(1,2), (C)(1)(b)
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The relationship originates by a request for treatment. When the pa-
tient accepts the services of a physician, the traditional physician-patient
relationship is created. 2 It is the request of the patient that triggers the
association because the doctor-patient relationship cannot be imposed
upon a competent patient without her consent. 26 However, a physician is
not obliged to respond to every call made and is not liable under any
circumstances unless the doctor has entered into a contract to render such
services.
27
A duty of care exists and continues to manifest as long as there is a
relationship, whether active or passive, unless there is some express or
clearly implied effort to terminate the relationship. 28 The termination of
the relationship is no easy task and has been characterized as a divorce.29
Hence, there are continuing duties following termination, most of which
focus on referral for appropriate follow up.30 The failure to terminate the
professional relationship in an appropriate manner gives rise to an action
of abandonment.3 1
C. Duties Imposed by the Relationship
The physician must follow the standard of care: The standard of care
has its origins in the custom of local practice, however, reliance on custom
is not entirely dispositive.3 2 Generally, the modern standard to which a
physician is held is that of reasonable care and diligence ordinarily ex-
ercised by members of the profession in similar cases in like conditions
25 Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Bergeron, 25 F.2d 680, (8th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 638 (1928).21 Stowers v. Armore Acres Hosp., 19 Mich. App. 115, 172 N.W.2d 497 (1969),
aff'd sub nom. Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386 Mich. 119, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971).
2' Rice v. Rinaldo, 95 N.E.2d 30 (Ohio C. P., Montgomery Co. 1950), affd 119
N.E.2d 30 (1951).
28 Kraus v. Cleveland Clinic, 442 F. Supp. 310 (N.D.Ohio 1977)(ordinary care
and skill must be exercised by doctor in decision to terminate relationship).
'2 Hayes-Bautista, Termination of the Patient-Practitioner Relationship: Di-
vorce, Patient Style, 17 J. HEALTH Soc. BEHAVIOR, 12-21 (March, 1976).
Kay, Terminating the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 53 J. MED. ED. 186, 189
(1978).
31 Supra note 24; McManus v. Donlan, 23 Wis. 2d 289, 127 N.W.2d 22 (1964).
See generally Weber, The Up and Coming Theory of Abandonment, 3 J. LEG. MED.
19-21 (1975).
" Morgan v. Sheppard, 188 N.E.2d 808 (1963). (The court held that the cus-
tomary conduct or methods of treatment generally employed do not furnish the
controlling test on the issue of negligence or the standard of care, but evidence
of conformity to those usual and customary methods should be considered along
with all other circumstances. For example, the observance of the custom of relying
on the nurse's sponge count does not conclusively show that the surgeon exercised
care that no foreign substance was left in the patient.). Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio
St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1929).
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in the doctor's locality or similar locality.33 The standard for a board
certified medical specialist should be that of a reasonable specialist prac-
ticing medicine in that same specialty in light of scientific knowledge in
that specialty field.34 All physicians involved in the case, including con-
sulting physicians involved only in a limited manner, share in the same
duties and responsibilities as the primary physician to the extent of their
involvement.3 5 Even interns must act as reasonably as other interns
would in like or similar circumstances.36
Physicians are not obligated to treat anyone with whom they have no
special relationship. This is recognized by the Principles of Medical Ethics
of the American Medical Association and case law.37 A doctor may refuse
to respond to a call from a person, even one urgently in need of care, if
the relation does not exist at the time the call is made. 3 However, a
physician employed by an insurer who, while examining an insured,
discovers a significant medical condition or information relating to treat-
ment, has a duty to disclose the discovery to the insured.39 Although
patients are generally obligated to participate and cooperate in their
treatment, the failure to follow the physician's instructions does not, per
se, terminate the relationship and relieve the physician of obligations.40
The physician must observe the doctrine of informed consent: As pre-
viously noted, a physician has a fiduciary duty to fully inform the patient
about a medical treatment or procedure. The failure to do so has tradi-
- Jenkins v. Clark, 7 Ohio App.3d 93, 454 N.E.2d 541 (1982). See Swanek v.
Hutzel Hosp., 320 N.W.2d 234 (Mich.App. 1982)(standard of care applicable in
medical malpractice action brought against obstetricians and gynecologists al-
leging negligence in allowing plaintiffs newborn son to be deprived of oxygen
during the birth process was a national standard equal to that of a specialist
practicing in the fields of obstetrics and gynecology). But see Wilson v. Sligar,
516 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. App. 1987)(where expert witness must testify either from
knowledge of the local standard or with regard to certain minimum standards of
care that were uniform throughout the country for particular practice).
m Mayhorn v. Pavey, 8 Ohio App.3d 189, 456 N.E.2d 1222 (1982).
15 Phillips v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 65 Ohio App. 2d 112, 416 N.E.2d 646
(1979).
T
6Rush v. Akron Gen. Hosp., 171 N.E.2d 378 (1957).
11 Childers v. Frye, 201 N.C. 42, 158 S.E. 744 (1931)(physician may arbitrarily
refuse to treat nonpatient); see Current Opinions, The Council of Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association, § 8.11(1989) [hereinafter
Current Opinions].
Childs v. Weiss, 440 S.W.2d 104 (Tex.Civ.App. 1969). But see Current Opin-
ions, supra note 37: 'The physician should, however, respond to the best of his
ability in cases of emergency where first aid treatment is essential." Id.
Meinze v. Holmes, 40 Ohio App.3d 143, 532 N.E.2d 170 (1987); compare
Sexton v. Petz, 170 Mich. App. 561, 428 N.W.2d 715 (1988)(Physician examines
firefighter at request of employer after employee files workers compensation
claim; held no physician-patient relationship upon which to base malpractice
claim where physician did not consider significance of employee's heart condition
in relation to demands of occupation and incorrectly diagnosed medical condition).
40 Annotations, Physician-Patient Relationship for Malpractice Purposes, 17
A.L.R. 4th 132 (1982).
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tionally created a cause of action in battery.41 The most often quoted case
in medical jurisprudence illustrates this issue eloquently: "Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body: and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable
in damages. '42 However, the modern cause of action for failure to properly
inform a patient lies in negligence.
43
In general, the doctrine of informed consent has three elements: knowl-
edge, autonomy, and competence." Appropriate information (knowledge)
must be relayed to the patient.45 The essence of autonomy is that the
patient ultimately has the option to withdraw from the care.46 Finally,
the doctor must make some reasonable determination that the patient is
competent to make a decision. 47 The importance of this process is that it
forms the cornerstone of the therapeutic alliance. For example, it provides
for an "open door" policy of communication, an additional opportunity to
review treatment in explicit risk-benefit terms, and it fosters trust.48
41 DeMay v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881)(Where a physician takes
an unprofessional married man with him to attend a confinement case when there
was no emergency, both are liable in damages to the woman. It makes no difference
that the patient or her husband thought that the intruder was a medical man
and, therefore, submitted without objection to his presence.).
42 Schoendorffv. New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)(J. Cardozo).
See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
LAW OF TORTS, § 9 (1984) (hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON).
Saxe v. U.S., 577 F. Supp. 135 (N.D. Ohio 1983), affd, 751 F.2d 386 (1984).
This case reflects the "reasonable-patient standard" for establishing the claim of
informed consent. The plaintiff must show that she was not informed if the ma-
terial risks and dangers of the proposed treatment, the unrevealed risk and dan-
gers which should have been disclosed actually occurred, and a reasonable person
would have refused the proposed treatment upon disclosure of the risks. Id. This
is a very difficult standard to prove. Expert testimony is not always required.
Other jurisdictions utilize the "professional standard." This examines what the
average competent physician would have done. The plaintiff must prove that she
was not informed of the diagnoses, diagnostic procedures and therapies, the ma-
terial risks, altenatives and expectations, and the doctor deviated from the stand-
ard of care in the specialty in terms of what physicians would ordinarily reveal.
This requires expert testimony. Logan v. Greenwich Hosp., 191 Conn. 282, 465
A.2d 294 (1983).
"Chervenak & McCullough, Clinical Guides to Preventing Ethical Conflicts
Between Pregnant Women and their Physicians, 162 A. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 303
(1990).
, Indiana has codified this element as an amendment to its Medical Malprac-
tice Act, IND. CODE ANN, § 16-9.5-1-4 (Burns 1987). Accordingly, the knowledge
must include: (1) the general nature of the patient's condition, (2) the proposed
treatment, procedure, exam or test, (3) the expected outcome of the treatment,
procedure, exam or test, (4) the material risks of the treatment, procedure, exam
or test, and (5) the reasonable alternatives to the treatment, procedure, exam or
test. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-4(c) (Burns 1987).
6 Voluntary means uncoerced and free of controlling influences. Supra note
44, at 304, citing R. FADEN & T. BEAUCHAMP, HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT (1986).
', For an excellent discussion of the evolution and ethics of the doctrine of
informed consent, see Flannery, Armitage, Hirsh & Wachman, Consent to Treat-
ment, in LEGAL MEDICINE: LEGAL DYNAMICS IN MEDICAL ENCOUNTERS 196-207
(1988).
Gutheil, Bursztajn, & Brodsky, Malpractice Prevention Through the Sharing
of Uncertainty: Informed Consent and the Therapeutic Alliance, 311 N. ENG. J.
MED. 49 (1984).
[Vol. 5:1
MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS
The physician must maintain confidentiality in the relationship: Gen-
erally, a physician may not disclose a patient's medical records without
the patient's consent 9. 4 It is improper for a physician to discuss a patient's
case with a lawyer representing the insurance company sued by the pa-
tient.,0 The patient is entitled to legal recourse and damages against a
doctor's breach of secrecy or undivided loyalty.5' This confidentiality be-
comes the foundation for the physician-patient privilege and the medical
records hearsay exceptions.5 2
In summary, the ethical principles grounding the physician patient
relationship and the fiduciary nature of this association create various
duties for the physician. There are fiduciary duties to render care, to do
no harm, to protect against injustice, to inform in good faith, and to
maintain confidentiality. Thus, the physician is clearly the patient's ad-
vocate and not merely a neutral caregiver. Accordingly, the physician is
not required to accept passively a patient's refusal for care. The doctor
may inquire, argue, protest, or even withdraw from the care, but he may
not use threats or deception to coerce a patient.53
There is an ethical obligation of beneficence and an ethical and legal
duty to respect autonomy. "Beneficence" is the duty to recommend the
best therapy while minimizing potential harm. "Autonomy" is the pa-
tient's right to accept or reject such recommendations based on personal
priorities and values. These rights are recognized and protected by law. 54
Thus, there is neither an affirmative duty nor an ethical obligation to
seek a court order for care contrary to a patient's request. The courts
have flatly refused to hold a physician liable for respecting a competent
adult's informed decision to refuse even life saving care.55
In the next section, this article will explore the constitutionality of the
physician-patient relationship and the doctrine of informed consent.
There will be an analysis of the duties created by these principles with
41 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2317.02, 4731.22 (Baldwin 1990); Gen. Motors Corp.
v. Director of Nat.1 Inst. of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 459 F. Supp.
235 (D.C.Ohio 1978), remanded 636 F.2d 163, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 857 (1981).
50 Supra note 24. The physician's ethical and legal duty not to reveal confi-
dences and the importance and necessity of trust to both the patient and the
medical profession requires that both patient and physician be protected by use
of only formal methods of discovery.
51Id.
52 E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §§ 98, 99 at 243-48, § 313 at 882 (3d
ed. 1984).
13 J. KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). See also Vogt
& Armitage, Physician-Patient Relationship, in Legal Medicine: Legal Dynamics
Of Medical Encounters, A. C. LEGAL MED. 188-95 (1988).
"In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,332,486, A.2d 1209, 1222 (1985) (personal integrity
for adults means that medical procedures cannot be performed without consent).
See also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 (1990)(principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment).
In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858, (1981).
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special attention paid to the reproductive health care of women. In ad-
dition, this article will focus on the rights, if any, which flow from the
physician-patient relationship to the mother and the fetus and the med-
ical-ethical principles underlying such rights.
III. THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP IN REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH CARE
Consider the following scenario: A thirty-nine year old attorney, about
eight months into her first pregnancy, after reading everything that she
can find about pregnancy, labor and delivery, requests that she have a
cesarian section two weeks prior to her due date. She states that the dis-
comfort of pregnancy and the risks of labor and delivery, in her opinion,
are outweighed by the benefits and low risk of morbidity of cesarian section,
for both her and the fetus. She argues that if a patient with a previous
cesarian section is given the option of trial of labor versus an operative
delivery, then she should have the same option, being a fully informed and
competent adult. She asks, "if a competent adult has the legal right to
refuse life saving care, why can't I request a cesarian section?",6
A purely legal analysis of this scenario may lead to the same conclusion
as reached by the above patient. In contrast, a medical-legal risk-benefit
analysis may indicate that the patient with a previous cesarian section
has incurred specific risks and personal experiences which can be distin-
guished from this patient. Thus, the offer of a repeat cesarian section is
part of the standard of care that an obstetrician has a duty to provide to
a patient who has undergone a prior cesarian section. The risk-benefit
analysis offered by the woman in this scenario does not really apply to
her situation. Simply put, an elective cesarian section, as requested by
the patient, is an unindicated procedure which the doctor has no duty to
perform.
However, an analysis from the perspective of the physician-patient
relationship may lead to an entirely different resolution. A frank dis-
cussion between the doctor and patient may reveal that she was quite
frightened of the pain of labor and the possibility of having the baby
damaged as a result of labor. This type of open-ended dialogue may un-
cover that the patient's experience as a personal injury attorney was at
the root of her fear. The therapeutic alliance engendered in the physician-
patient relationship would allow for a more compassionate discussion of
her fears and may eventually lead to a normal labor and delivery.
The issue presented has been the subject of debate in the obstetrical literature
and also on "ACOGnet", the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology
computer network which allows for "on-line" consultation and discussion. See also
address by Gates, University of Michigan Medical Center Conference (Aug. 17-
19, 1990) (conference entitled ETHics, HUmANrIEs AND LAW IN OBsTETRIcs AND
GYNECOLOGY) (workbook available from author).
[Vol. 5:1
MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS
There are two points to be garnered from this scenario. First, where
there is no duty for a physician to provide an unindicated procedure, there
does not appear to be any inherent right of the patient to demand such
care. Hence, Holmes' axiom that duties precede rights holds true. Second,
the unique nature of the physician-patient relationship allows for a res-
olution of problems that would not flow from a purely legal or a medical-
legal analysis. This section will illustrate these points as they occur in
the area of reproductive health care.
A. The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Physician-Patient Relationship
It is not ironic that the physician-patient relationship was granted
constitutional respect in the abortion cases. Physicians have been per-
forming abortions for forty centuries. 57 Abortion practice was widespread
in the United States from 1840-1870, and abortionists routinely adver-
tised for patients.58 Interestingly, the laws governing abortion at that
time were based on English Common Law. Women were free to have
abortions until "quickening" (the perception of first fetal movement that
occurs at about twenty weeks of gestation); thereafter abortion was pro-
hibited. Given the Webster decision, this situation is no different today.5 9
Roe v. Wade60 underscores the physician-patient relationship. "This
means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this
'compelling' point, the attending physician, in consultation with his pa-
-1 Allen & Pearse, The Implications of Webster for Practicing Physicians, 262
J.A.M.A. 1510 (1989).
58 H. SPEERT, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY, (1980).
Medical societies formed in response to such "quackery" which was diverting
patients away from the more "respectable" physicians who did not advertise. The
recently formed American Medical Association started an "anti-abortion crusade"
where the goal was to consolidate its control over the provision of health care.
This crusade resulted in forty anti-abortion laws enacted from 1860-1880. K.
LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLrrICS OF MOTHERHOOD 29-35 (1984). Abortion in
any state was illegal for the next one hundred years. However, abortions continued
in spite of the laws which were more often ignored than unenforced. Actually,
there were as many abortions prior to Roe (1950-73) as thereafter. See also J.
MoHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL POLICY,
1800-1900 (1978).
59 See supra note 57. The Supreme Court upheld a Missouri law requiring
physicians to perform tests to determine viability before performing an abortion
on a woman the physician reasonably believes may be twenty weeks pregnant
or more. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct 3040 (1989). What
is striking about this decision is the lack of virtually any discussion of the phy-
sician-patient relationship and the standard of medical care pertaining to abortion
of the viable fetus. Specifically, the abortion of a viable fetus, not otherwise
impaired, has always been contrary to the standard of medical care, replete with
many sanctions including loss of medical licensure. See, e.g., Eastman, Induced
Abortion and Contraception: A Consideration of Ethical Philosophy in Obstetrics,
22 OB. GYN. SURVEY 3 (1967); Sauer, Attitudes to Abortion in America: 1800-
1973, 28 Pop. STUDIES 66 (1974).
'o410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1990-91]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
tient, is free to determine, without regulation by the state, that, in his
medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. '61 "With
respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the 'compelling' point is at viability.6 2 But note, "[flor the stage subsequent
to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of
human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preser-
vation of the life or health of the mother.
6 3
The subsequent abortion decisions continue to emphasize the physician-
patient relationship, as well as the importance of informed consent. In
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth," the Court construed in-
formed consent to mean the giving of information to the patient as to
what would be done and its consequences. "To ascribe more meaning than
this might well confine the attending physician in an undesired and
uncomfortable straightjacket in the practice of his profession."'6 The
Court grappled with limits on informed consent in City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health.66 "This does not mean, however, that a
State has unreviewable authority ,to decide what information a woman
must be given before she chooses to have an abortion. It remains primarily
the responsibility of the physician to ensure that appropriate information
is conveyed to his patient, depending on her circumstances. 6 7 "In ac-
cordance with the ethical standards of the profession, a physician will
advise the patient to defer the abortion when he thinks this will be
beneficial to her."8 Otherwise, after appropriate written consent, a State
may not demand that she delay the effectuation of that decision.6 9 In
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology,70 the Court
struck down various Pennsylvania statutes that infringed upon the phy-
sician-patient decision-making process.7 1 Even Webster,72 which upheld
61 Id. at 163.
62 Id.
Id, at 164 (emphasis added). The limiting factor in this landmark case ap-
pears to be the decision of the physician.
' 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The Missouri laws struck down were spousal consent,
parental consent, arbitrary limits on available abortion procedures, and criminal
and civil liability for physicians. For an excellent analysis of the issue of spousal
consent and paternal rights, see Note, Whose Womb is it Anyway: Are Paternal
Rights Alive and Well Despite Danforth? 11 CARDozo L. REv. 686 (1990).
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67, n. 8.
66462 U.S. 416 (1983). The Court found unconstitutional Ohio Statute § 1870.07
which prohibited a physician from performing an abortion until twenty-four hours
after the pregnant woman signs a consent form. Id. at 450.
67 Id. at 443.
6 Id. at 450, n. 43.
r9Id.
70 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
71 Id. at 763. The statutes required descriptions of fetal development at two
week intervals as part of the information exchanged during informed consent.
"All this is, or comes close to being, state medicine imposed upon the woman, not
the professional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially structures - as it
obviously was intended to do - the dialogue between the woman and her physi-
cian." Id.
72 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
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the constitutionality of the Missouri statutes requiring viability testing
of a fetus prior to an abortion at nineteen weeks or beyond, still gives
voice to the physician's judgments.7
In the first case to address the so-called right to die, the Court in Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,74 acknowledged that the in-
formed consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort
law.75 This Court also noted that "the common law doctrine of informed
consent is viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent
individual to refuse medical treatment. '76 This was echoed in the holding
of the case, specifically "itihe principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions." 77
The Supreme Court continues to apply to Holmes' axiom the theory
that principles elicit duties which generate rights. In the abortion deci-
sions, the Court holds that the responsibility for informed consent lies
with the physician whose duty is to insure that appropriate information
flows to the patient. In Cruzan, the Court acknowledges that the physi-
cian's duty to inform transforms into a patient's right to refuse. "The
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient
generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment. '78
As will be observed in the next section, the scientific principles of medical
treatment which formulate the standard of medical care for the pregnant
patient, develop into various duties to render such care. Subsequently,
these duties mature into maternal rights.
B. The Physician-Patient Relationship in Pregnancy
The physician's role in pregnancy care is relatively new in the history
of medicine. Childbearing was almost exclusively the province of the
midwife. In 1765, William Shippen in Philadelphia announced his course
in midwifery and shocked the world.7 9 The thought of delivery by a "man
midwife" was scandalous in late 18th century America, and this attitude
was quite pervasive. Obstetrics was finally accepted into the curriculum
of the country's four medical schools by 1800. This was accomplished over
the outcry of conservative men and women that it was against God's
" Id. at 3055. The holding notes that "amniocentesis" or "ultrasound" testing
is required if, in his or her judgment, one or both of these tests are relevant to
determine viability. Id. "Amniocentesis" describes a test which entails placing a
needle into the sac of fluid, in which the fetus grows, to retrieve a sample for
analysis. "Ultrasound" testing involves focusing a high frequency sound wave
into the womb at the fetus and measuring the size of the fetal parts as determined
from the echo of the sound wave. This will give a relative estimate of the ges-
tational age of the fetus based upon its size.
1- 110 S.Ct 2841 (1990).
71 Id. at 2847.
76 Id. at 2851.
77 Id.
71 Id. at 2847 (emphasis added).
" H. SPEERT, supra note 58, at 14.
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ordination to allow a male to attend a delivery.80 Not surprisingly, it was
advantaged urban women who started a trend which ultimately accepted
the physician's role in pregnancy by including a trained physician at the
bedside, in addition to the midwife, friends and family."'
Although the section of Obstetrics of the American Medical Association
was started in 1860, it was not until 1931 that the American Board of
Obstetrics and Gynecology administered its first certification exam for
this specialty. 82 The basic principles of the specialty of obstetrics insured
that these physicians were especially equipped, by training and experi-
ence, to recognize, diagnose, and treat the complications that beset the
pregnant woman.M The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology
was founded in 1951. Its immediate directive focused on the mother to
lower the incidence of maternal mortality in America.84
In 1977, maternal mortality had substantially decreased and the "Col-
lege" initiated a second directive, that is, to lower the prenatal mortality
rate." The essential approach to the pregnant patient has been predicated
8D Id. In 1809, while Ephriam McDowell, the "father of abdominal surgery,"
performed an operation on the ovary of Mrs. Todd, protestors actually rocked his
house and waited, "rope in hand," should anything go wrong. Id. at 175.
8' For the social historian's approach to obstetrical practice in America, see
J.W. LEAvr, BROUGHT To BED: CHILDBEARING IN AMERICA, 1750-1950 (1986).
See also Scholten, CHILDBEARING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, 16-0-1850 (1985).
82 H. SPEERT, supra note 58, at 83.
Nocon & Collman, Perinatal Malpractice: Risks and Prevention, 32 J. REPRO.
MED. 83, 87 (1987).
- Beacham, A History of American Obstetric and Gynecologic Organizations
and the Genesis of the American Academy, 1 0BSTET. GYNECOL. 115 (1953). The
maternal death rate was about 600 per 100,000 live births in 1930. With the
advent of antibiotics, improved accessibility to blood supplies and improved treat-
ment during labor, the rate dropped to about 30/100,000 by 1960. The major
causes of death were hemorrhage, toxemia (high blood pressure), infection (in-
cluding septic abortion), abortion, and medical complications. Immediately after
1973, there was a striking drop in death due to abortion (all causes). This ac-
counted for approximately 20% of all maternal deaths. The current rate has been
7-10 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. Ragan, Maternal Mortality in In-
diana, 82 IND. MED. 712 (1989). See also Rochat, Maternal Mortality in the United
States: Report for the Maternal Mortality Collaborative, 72 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 91
(1988). In contrast, the maternal death rate for first trimester abortion is 0.5 per
100,000 abortions and increases to 6/100,000 by 16 weeks. Thus, through at least
the first 16 weeks of pregnancy, abortion is the safest treatment of pregnancy
with respect to a woman's chances of survival. W. HERN, ABORTION PRACTICE 26
(1984).
National Foundation - March of Dimes, Committee on Perinatal Health,
Toward Improving the Outcome of Pregnancy: Recommendations for the Regional
Development of Maternal and Perinatal Health Services (1977). The perinatal
death rate is the combination of fetal deaths (stillborn fetuses greater than 500
grams or more than 20 weeks gestation) plus neonatal deaths (newborn deaths
in the first 28 days of life) per 1000 live births. In 1974, the average perinatal
mortality rate was 25-30 /1000; now it varies from 12-18/1000. In comparison,
infant mortality pertains to deaths from the first months to the end of the first
year of life. About 70% of all perinatal mortality and subsequent infant mortality
is due to premature birth. Behrman, Preventing Low Birthweight: Summary,
Committee to Study the Prevention of Low Birth Weight, Division of Health
Promotion and Disease Prevention, Institute of Medicine (1985). See also Cren-
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upon these two directives:
The transcendent objective of obstetrics is that every pregnancy
be wanted and that it culminate in a healthy mother and a
healthy baby. Obstetrics strives to minimize the number of
women and infants who die as a result of the reproductive
process or who are left physically, intellectually, or emotionally
injured therefrom. 6
The legal standard of care, that is, the obstetrician's duty to provide
reasonable medical care, has evolved from these principles. The specialty
of obstetrics has always held that the welfare of the mother and fetus are
so intertwined and inseparable that it is impractical to attempt to dis-
tinguish between them. Nor was the fetus perceived as separate from the
mother in the legal senseY7 Clearly, the physician has a legal duty to
promote maternal well being. Although the fetus is often perceived as a
patient to whom doctors owe some duty, the standard of care only requires
that the physician monitor the fetus appropriately and recommend treat-
ment to the mother. The obligation to promote fetal health is derived
from the duty to the pregnant patient. Thus, there is no requirement or
need to view the fetus as a separate entity in order to conform to a duty
of care. Due to the fiduciary nature of the obstetrician-patient relation-
ship, the doctor owes all legal duties to the mother.
C. The Status of the Fetus in the Physician-Patient Relationship
Historically, there does not appear to be a legal duty to the fetus which,
per se, would supersede one to the motherM88 According to Roe v. Wade,
89
shaw, Payne & Blackmon, Prematurity and the Obstetrician: A Regional Neonatal
Intensive Care Nursery is Not Enough, 147 AM. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 125 (1983);
Bloom, Changing Infant Mortality; The Need to Spend More While Getting Less,
73 PEDIATR. 862 (1984).
Unfortunately, traditional obstetrical care is quite limited in ability to prevent
the effects of preterm labor. Iams, Current Status of Prematurity Prevention, 262
J.A.M.A. 265 (1989) (simple improvements in access to care produce striking
improvements in outcome). See also Yawn & Yawn, Preterm Birth Prevention In
a Rural Practice, 262 J.A.M.A. 230 (1989)(increased emphasis placed on education
and reassessment of "low risk" women reduced the overall preterm birth rate by
30%.)
F. CUNNINGHAM, P. MACDONALD & N. GANT, WILLIAMS OBSTETRMICS 1 (18th
ed. 1989)(hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS OesERrrcs).
17 Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). This is the first reported case
alleging a cause of action for prenatal injuries. Justice Holmes denied separate
recovery on behalf of the fetus explaining that the fetus was part of the mother
at the time of injury and any damage to it, recoverable by the mother. Id. It
should be noted that Holmes' father was a venerated obstetrician.
m See generally J. FEINBERG, THE PROBLEM OF ABORTION (2d ed. 1984).
'9 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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nowhere in our ordered scheme of liberty or tradition is the fetus consid-
ered a person.9 "[T]hroughout the major portion of the 19th century
prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today,
[which] persuades us that the word "person", as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does not include the unborn."91 Even though the Webster
decision has recognized a state interest in the well being of the fetus,
92
the Court has not declared that interest superior to the mother's due
process rights.93 Roe is still the rule on this point and refuses to elevate
the common law interests in the fetus to a constitutional right.
9 4
In contrast, virtually all of what is currently argued as a foundation
for autonomous fetal "rights" comes from the common law. For example,
although property laws have recognized a "child in being" as entitled to
an estate or inheritance, such entitlements have always been contingent
upon a live birth.95 The common law crime of feticide has been incon-
sistently recognized. If the fetus survived birth and then died, it is ac-
tionable, but not otherwise.9 6 Although the Model Penal Code does not
recognize feticide, 97 modem feticide statutes impose criminal sanctions
against third parties no matter when the fetus dies, and usually require
both the fetus to be viable and the perpetrator to intend to kill the fetus
or its mother.99 Acknowledgement of the fetus as a legal entity, entitled
to a recovery for prenatal injury, has only recently occurred in tort law.9
9 1d. at 158.
91 Id.
92 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3055 (1989).
93Note, Developments, supra note 5, at 1561.
" Id.
9 Johnson, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. J. 599, 601 (1986)
(courts have only recognized the fetus as a legal entity in limited contexts con-
tingent upon live birth). The Uniform Probate Code has codified a common law
right of inheritance which accrues to a fetus when born. UNDf. PROBATE CODE §
2-108, 8 U.L.A. 66 (1983). The common law has also allowed courts to appoint
guardians to protect such fetal interests. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn:
Can the State Intervene?, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 14 (1984).
See Myers, supra note 95, at 12.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) comment 4(c)(1980).
Note, Developments, supra note 5, at 1560 (emphasis added). CAL. PENAL
CODE § 187(b)(3)(West 1988). See IND. CODE ANN. 35-42-1-6 (Burns 1988)(a person
who knowlingly or intentionally terminates a human pregnancy with an intention
other than to produce a live birth or remove a dead fetus, commits feticide, a
Class C felony). This statute clashes headlong with the physician's standard of
care in terminating a pregnancy to protect the life or health of the mother. See
infra note 120. Compare to California, which holds that it is first degree murder
to kill a viable fetus with malice aforethought, but it is not murder at all if the
act is "solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the mother." People v. Smith,
59 Cal.App.3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976).
Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946)(when direct tortious injury
is inflicted upon a viable fetus, subsequently born alive, the child has a cognizable
cause of action. This case reversed the holding in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of North-
hampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884), which denied recovery to the estate of a fetus for
wrongful death.).
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Generally, recovery has been limited for the tortious conduct of a third
party which inflicts harm to a viable fetus, even if the fetus is stillborn.100
It should be noted, however, that such a recovery is intended to protect
the mother's expectation of having a liveborn, healthy child.101
Interestingly, in Grodin v. Grodin,102 the Michigan Court of Appeals
found in favor of a child who alleged that its mother, who took the an-
tibiotic tetracycline, was negligent by failing to inform her doctor or
request a pregnancy test. The court apparently relied on the holding in
Womack v. Buchhorn,103 that "a child has a legal right to begin life with
a sound mind and body. If the wrongful conduct of another interferes with
that right ... damages for such harm should be recoverable by the
child."' 1 4 The Womack holding only recognizes that the child has a right,
distinct from its parents, to recovery against third parties (doctors) for
prenatal injuries. But upon what duty is this right predicated? In an
earlier Michigan Court of Appeals case, which was not addressed by
Grodin, the court held that the state is not empowered to enforce upon
parents and doctors legal duties to the fetus.10 5 It appears that the Grodin
court violated the inseparability of the mother and fetus and held the
mother to the same standard of conduct as a third party.-
In contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed and criticized a lower
court's decision which relied on Grodin, holding that a child has a right
to recovery for prenatal injuries caused by the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle by its parent.10 7 The court suggested that such a "legal
fiction" would infringe upon a mother's right to autonomy pitting mother
against fetus as adversaries from conception until birth. 08 The Illinois
'0 See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON LAW OF ToRTs,'§ 55 at 369-70 (1984).
101 Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal
Rights, 10 HARv. WOMEN's L. J. 9, 38 (1987).
102 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980). This drug will eventually cause
discoloration of the child's permanent teeth.
10 384 Mich. 718, 187 N.W.2d 218 (1971).
- Id. at 725, 187 N.W.2d at 222 (quoting Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364,
157 A.2d 497,503 (1960)). But see S. ELIAS & G. ANNAS, REPRODUCTIVE GENETICS
AND THE LAw 118-20 (1987)(the authors conclude that there is no "right" to be
born physically and mentally sound.)
... In Re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App. 219, 263, N.W.2d 37 (1977)(fetuses are
not "children" over whom a court can assume control due to parental abuse).
100 Grodin, 102 Mich. App. at 397, 301 N.W.2d at 870. The case merely creates
a novel approach to find a deep pocket. That is, it's holding would allow the
homeowner's liability policy to compensate the child for negligent conduct of the
policyholder, which did, in fact, occur in the home.
107 Stallman v. Youngquist, 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E. 2d 355 (1988). Again, it
appears that the child was seeking a recovery from the mother's auto insurance
policy. This issue really comes within the rubric of an automobile "guest statute"
analysis in which most jurisdictions limit liability, by statute, to wanton and
wilfull misconduct causing injury to a guest passenger unless the guest passenger
is a spouse, parent, child or stepchild of any age, brother, sister, or hitchiker. IND.
CODE § 9-3-3-1 (1988). Is a fetus a "child of any age?"
100 Stallman, 125 Ill. 2d at 278, 531 N.E.2d at 359.
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court also stated that it should be left to the legislature, not tort liability,
to determine if pregnant women had a legal duty to their fetus. In ad-
dition, the court stated that the way to ensure healthy babies was through
"before-the-fact education of all women and families about prenatal de-
velopment."'0 9 This is entirely consistent with the physician's perspective
regarding care of the fetus.
The physician-fetal relationship is simple; it exists because of and
through the mother. The fact that modern technology has allowed the
fetus to become more accessible for diagnosis and treatment does not
negate the truly unique and inseparable nature of the maternal-fetal
relationship. They are two patients with access to one through the other.1 0
The medical principles that formulate the standards for pregnancy care
focus attention on both the mother and the fetus within her as a unit,
"assessing the attendant risks to each during the course of care." ' Since
the welfare of the fetus is of paramount concern to the overwhelming
majority of women, conflicts are infrequent. "The role of the obstetrician
should be one of an informed educator and counselor weighing the risks
and benefits to both patients as well as realizing that tests, judgments
and decisions are fallible."'1 2 Obstetricians should refrain from perform-
ing procedures unwanted by the woman who is obviously the only one
who could give informed consent in the maternal-fetal duality. The use
of judicial authority to resolve conflicts is almost never warranted. 3
It was not coincidence that the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG), Committee on Ethics, made the preceding com-
ments at the time In re A.C. was decided." 4 These comments were a direct
response to a decision that ignored the physician-patient relationship and
violated the inseparability of the maternal-fetal duality. Most recently,
in a seven to one en banc decision, the Appellate Justices of the District
of Columbia reversed the earlier In re A.C. holding." 5 At first glance, it
seems persuasive to argue that, within the framework of Roe v. Wade,
women who chose to bear children have an ethical duty to accept rea-
sonable medical care to benefit themselves and their fetuses. However,
the D.C. Court of Appeals noted that Roe v. Wade never gave the fetus
primary or usual status with its mother, even in the third trimester." 6
The forceful decision mirrored the ACOG opinion which stated that "in
virtually all cases the question of what is to be done is to be decided by
the patient - the pregnant woman - on behalf of herself and the fetus."' 17
0 Id. at 280, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
110 See Committee on Ethics, American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Patient Choice: Maternal-Fetal Conflict, Comm. Opinion No. 55 (Oct. 1987).
- Id.
112 Id.
113Id.
114 See supra note 7; In Re A.C., 539 A.2d 203 (D.C.App. 1988), reh'g granted,
573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990).
"'In Re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990).
116 Curran, Court Ordered Cesarian Sections Receive Judicial Defeat, 323 N.
ENG. J. MED. 489 (1990).
17 Id. at 491.
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In summary, the obstetrician is the mother's advocate. Clearly, all legal
and ethical duties flow to the mother, and it is critical to focus upon the
physician-patient relationship when controversy occurs. Decisions by
physicians that force their patients into undesired treatment breach their
fiduciary duties, especially those to prevent injustice. In addition, com-
pelled medical care also violates traditional norms of ethics and law.
Nevertheless, the physician may be a fetal advocate, especially since there
is an ethical obligation to promote fetal health. However, fetal advocacy
does not mean that the state can coerce a doctor under penalty to follow
this obligation as if it were a legal duty. Although it is correctly assumed
that a well informed woman will desire to protect the fetus, this does not
mature into an inherent fetal "right" to such protection. This is because
the pregnant woman, like any other adult, has the essential right to accept
or reject medical recommendations based on their personal priorities and
values." 8
IV. THE MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS
This section will focus on the so-called maternal-fetal conflicts, their
legitimate and not so legitimate foundations, their implications for so-
ciety, and the physician's role in their resolution. There are two basic
situations that lead to divergence between the mother's interests in her-
self and the fetus. In one, she may refuse a diagnostic procedure or treat-
ment that may benefit the fetus and, if denied, may lead to fetal morbidity
or mortality. This setting encompasses the area of court ordered obstet-
rical care. In the other situation, her behavior with respect to her health
or lifestyle may be adverse to the well being of the fetus.1 9 The latter
circumstance embodies the conflicts associated with abortion, the "toxic"
workplace, and the criminalization of harmful maternal conduct, specif-
ically for substance abuse in pregnancy. "Ultimately, the characterization
of the maternal-fetal relationship as one of conflicting rights denies the
physical and social context of pregnancy.., undermines the importance
of connection between mother and fetus .... [and] has led to policies that
effectively protect neither.' 120
A. Court Ordered Obstetrical Care
There are a number of articles in the medical literature which address
the compulsory treatment of pregnant women. Unfortunately, many con-
tain incorrect and misleading statements about the law, especially re-
garding the legal liability of physicians for either accepting or rejecting
a patient's desires.' 2' One common mistake is to state that Roe v. Wade
M18Allen & Pearse, supra note 57.
119 Supra note 111.
12' Note, Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 6, at 1337.
21 Nelson & Milliken, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Life,
Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 J.A.M.A. 1060, 1061 nn. 16-26 (1988).
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supports compulsory care of the mother for the benefit of the fetus. This
is based on the misinterpretation of the Court's holding that the state
has a compelling interest in protecting the potentiality of human life at
the point of viability. Roe clearly asserts that the state may restrict
abortion after viability is established only if it does not affect the mother's
life or health. Roe is entirely silent on the issue of enforced treatment to
promote fetal health.
22
A corollary to this argument is the "waiver" of maternal due process
rights. In this context, once a woman elects to waive her right to abortion
and carry the fetus to term, she is no longer free to take action that would
endanger the fetus. 23 This argument is ineffective on three accounts.
First, a woman may elect to terminate a pregnancy after viability to
preserve her health.12 Second, no actual waiver can occur until viability.
This is well after the fetus has been exposed to the greatest risk of harm
as it is in the first trimester when the fetus is most sensitive to adverse
maternal behavior like cigarette smoking, occasional use of alcohol, and
environmental pollution. Finally, even after the mother decides to carry
to term, she does not waive her right to conduct the labor and delivery
in a manner she desires. 125 Constitutionally, no cases have established a
woman's legal duty to accept any risk for the sake of the fetus. 126
'2Id. at 1062.
12 Id. See also Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 437 (1983).
'2A The author faces this situation virtually every week in his obstetrical prac-
tice. When a condition known as toxemia becomes severe (high blood pressure,
kidney failure, blood clotting dysfunction leading to hemorrhage, and liver fail-
ure), the patient is at high risk for serious bodily harm although women rarely
die of this condition. If this should occur at 24 - 28 weeks, the outlook for the
fetus is grim. The standard of medical care expects that a competent physician
will offer the patient the option to terminate the pregnancy. In the author's
experience, no patient has ever refused that option. The waiver theory would be
an unethical and meaningless solution to this problem, since it would simulta-
neously force the doctor to violate the standard of care and subject the mother to
a high risk of permanent damage such as paralyzing stroke, kidney failure, liver
failure, or death. Similarly, a broad restriction of abortion to only those situations
which are life threatening would create the same dilemma, that is, a physician
would face violating the standard of care or violating a law prohibiting abortion.
125 Abortions after viability cannot be totally forbidden because the mother's
interest in the preservation of her life is superior to the state's compelling interest
in the preservation of viable fetal life. Nelson, Buggy & Weill, Forced Medical
Treatment of Pregnant Women: Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the
Rest, 37 HAsrnNGs L. J. 703, 742 (1986).
126 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (struck down a law requiring the
mother, in second trimester abortion, to undergo a hysterotomy, that is, a mini
cesarian section because it offered the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted
alive. The law was struck because it did not specify that a woman's health must
always prevail over fetus's life and health when they conflict). See Thornburgh
v. A. College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (struck down a
Pennsylvania law that required a woman to accept an increased medical risk to
save her viable fetus. Laws requiring a trade-off between a woman's health and
fetal survival are unconstitutional.).
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Another argument which would appeal to physicians focuses on the
"good Samaritan" nature of the medical profession. This view establishes
a state's interest in maintaining the integrity of the medical profession
by supporting the position that doctors must be allowed to save the fetus
in jeopardy. This argument would assert that the fetus, as a third party,
has some inherent "right" to medical care distinct from its mother. How-
ever, the medical model for obstetrical care does not perceive the fetus
or infant as separate from its mother. 12 7 Futhermore, the artifice of a
distinct fetal "right" to care oversimplifies the complexities of the inter-
dependence of the maternal-fetal unit and the more important issues of
dependence and responsibility. 128
This approach confuses the duty to care with the duty to rescue. Al-
though a parent has a legal duty to care for its child because of the
"fiduciary" nature of the parent-child relationship, there is no legal duty
to rescue a child at the risk of any peril to the parent. 129 Thus, a parent
cannot be compelled to save a child from a burning building or donate
bone marrow to a leukemic child. 30 If there is no duty to rescue a child,
that is, a person with cognizable rights, it does not follow that there
,should be a duty to rescue a fetus or a corresponding fetal "right" to be
rescued. '31
An insidious problem arises within the obstetrician-patient relation-
ship concerning the basic decision-making strategies utilized to provide
care and the use of informed consent. 132 Due to the concerns for her baby
during pregnancy, a woman is in a particularly vulnerable situation re-
garding consent. Given the high degree of uncertainty that can occur in
pregnancy, the doctor's approach to a crisis may be presented and per-
ceived as the only legitimate approach. This viewpoint virtually guar-
antees acceptance of the doctor's recommendation and circumvents the
process of informed consent. 13 Thus, the decision-making strategies cur-
rently used in obstetrical practice may be a substantial factor involved
in the so-called maternal-fetal conflicts.
"I For an excellent discussion of this concept see Thoman, Infant Development
Viewed in the Mother-Infant Relationship, in FETAL AND MATERNAL MEDICINE
243 (1980).
121 Note, Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 6, at 1337.
129 A fundamental tenet of American law is the absence of a duty to rescue.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 42, § 56, at 365 (when the duty to care, in a
special relationship involves risk, any duty to rescue is diminished); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 Comment D (1979) (a rescuing actor is not required to
subordinate his interests to those of another).
130 McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (1978) (forcible extraction of living
body tissue causes revulsion to the judicial mind).
131 See also S. ELIAS, et al., supra note 104, at 118-20 (1987) (the authors
conclude that there is no "right" to be born physically and mentally sound). See
generally Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court
Ordered Cesarians, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1951, 1975 (1986) (it seems reasonable to
hold that the states power to protect fetus should not exceed its power to protect
independently existing individuals).
132 See Informed Consent, supra note 14.
3 Id. at 68.
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The basic strategy in American obstetrical practice is to monitor the
fetus and mother during the entire course of pregnancy, labor, and de-
livery. Some examples include the use of routine electronic fetal moni-
toring (EFM) during labor and routine amniotomy for internal fetal
monitoring. Physicians also perform a routine episiotomy for delivery."4
This strategy is an appropriate risk averse approach which is best applied
when the level of uncertainty is high, and the worst potential outcome
is extremely bad. Although it would appear to be ideally suited to ob-
stetrical care, in reality, most obstetrical patients are low risk requiring
minimal intervention. There is a growing body of medical literature in-
dicating that these procedures are meddlesome, unnecessary, and cause
far more complications than they prevent. 3 5
Since doctors accept these routine procedures as "state of the art" ob-
stetrical care, the uncertainties are not often questioned or discussed with
patients. This leads to a problem with informed consent when a mother
questions the use of these procedures. First, some doctors are not com-
fortable revealing their uncertainty. Second, this strategy focuses on fetal
risk and while it takes aggressive means to prevent fetal risk, it increases
the maternal risks by increasing surgical delivery. 36 Finally, this strat-
egy creates barriers. The focus on the fetus views the mother as a barrier
to be overcome in order to assess the fetus. As medical technology im-
proves the ability to penetrate this barrier, the possibility for value con-
flicts increases proportionately. 37 Where the doctor may view these
conflicts as between the mother and baby, they actually are between the
doctor and patient.
Another strategy that occurs in obstetrical care applies when the fetus
is in great peril and allows for aggressive intervention to give the fetus
1Id. at 70. "Amniotomy" is the rupture of the protective bag of waters, in
which the fetus floats. It is often done to induce labor, enhance labor, and to attach
EFM devices. WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS, supra note 86, at 313. "Episiotomy" is a
surgical incision made in the opening of the vagina to prevent spontaneous lac-
eration, arguably considered more difficult to repair. Id. at 316.
115 U.S. Dept. Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, National
Institute of Health, CESARIAN CHILDBIRTH, NIH Pub. No. 82-2067 (1982). The
consensus indicates that the use of routine EFM is the most substantial factor
causing the high cesarian section rate in the U.S. This rate is currently about
25%. Routine EFM has yet to prove its value, especially in predicting those fetuses
at risk for neurologic damage. Freeman, Intrapartum Fetal Monitoring - A Dis-
appointing Story, 322 N. ENG. J. MED. 624 (1990); Shy, Effects of Electronic-Fetal-
Heart Rate Monitoring, As Compared with Periodic Ascultation, on the Neurologic
Development of Premature Infants, 322 N. ENG. J. MED. 588 (1990). Routine am-
niotomy causes an increased incidence of infection. Okada, Chow & Bruce, Neo-
natal Scalp Abscess and Fetal Monitoring: Factors Associated with Infection, 129
A. J. OBsTET. GYNECOL. 185 (1977). Finally, routine episiotomy is itself associated
with more severe lacerations than it is presumed to prevent. Shiono, Klebanoff
& Carey, Midline Episiotomies: More harm Than Good? 75 OBsTET. GYNECOL. 765
(1990).
,-Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 72.
'
7 Id. at 77.
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its "only hope," even when the chance of success is extremely low.1318 The
problems for informed consent in this approach becomes self evident when
the physician says, "don't you want to do everything for your baby?" This
attitude smothers the patient's concerns about the surgery and future
reproduction. As it fulfills a strong need to "do something," the recom-
mended procedure is almost always performed. 139 This strategy forces a
value judgment directed only at the fetus and does not do justice to the
quality of the life issue inherent in these problems.1 40 Likewise, when a
mother objects to the recommended procedure, she is perceived as being
in conflict with her fetus, rather than the doctor.
It is in these emotionally charged situations, clouded by a high degree
of uncertainty, that a dysfunctional physician-patient relationship can
occur. The result is the pursuit of some form of court order to mandate
medical care, ostensibly to protect the fetus. Most of these orders occur
at the trial court level and go unreported.' 4' There are few reported ap-
pellate court decisions that support judicial sanction of medical inter-
138 Id. at 72. See supra note 7. In re A.C. is the prime example of all the problems
associated with the "only hope" approach. Another example of this approach is
-to perform a cesarian section for the under 1000 gram infant whose mother is in
premature labor that cannot be stopped. The theoretical basis for this approach
is if a cesarian section is a less traumatic route for a term infant, then it must
be so for the preterm. No empirical evidence supports the benefit of cesarian
section for all preterm infants. Malloy, Rhoads, Schramm & Land, Increasing
Cesarian Section Rates on Very Low Birth Weight Infants: Effects on Outcome,
262 J.A.M.A. 1475 (1989) (the authors were unable to find reasons to justify the
sharp increase in the use of cesarian sections for these small infants). The cesarian
section is almost always of the "classical" variety, that is, it invades the upper-
most, contractile portion of the uterus placing the mother at substantial risk for
rupture in a subsequent pregnancy. In effect, the patient becomes an "obstetrical
cripple," doomed to undergo repeat cesarian sections thereafter. By contrast, a
woman who has a cesarian section at term, perhaps for "fetal distress," will have
the lower, noncontractile portion of her uterus cut in a transverse manner. The
risk of rupture in subsequent pregnancy is so low that she is a candidate for a
"vaginal delivery after cesarian" (VBAC). Taffel, Cesarian Section in America:
Dramatic Trends, 1970 to 1987, STAs. BULL. 2-11 (Oct.-Dec. 1989).
139 Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 75.
-o Although some very low birth weight infants may survive the "heroic"
cesarian section, those between 500 and 1000 grams (1-2 lbs) will have a greater
than 50% incidence of cerebral palsy and chronic respiratory problems. Wood,
Katz, Bose, Gollsby & Kraybill, Survival and Morbidity of Extremely Premature
Infants Based on Obstetric Assessment of Gestational Age, 74 OBSTET. GYNECOL.
889 (1989).
141 Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316
N. ENG. J. MED. 1192 (1987). Kolder's survey of 15 cases of court ordered cesarian
section revealed that only two were found in the state and federal reporters. Her
study involved a total of 21 cases of mandated medical care and indicated that
81% were Black, Asian, or Hispanic woman, 24% of whom did not speak English.
The cases revealed a critical inability on the part of physicians to communicate
with their patients in these circumstances. Thus, the refusal of treatment could
not have been "against medical advice" if such advice was poorly explained or
incomprehensible. In addition, 46% of the directors of maternal-fetal medicine
programs felt that women who jeopardized their fetuses should be forcibly de-
tained while 47% endorsed court ordered cesarian section. Id.
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vention, none of which rest on solid medical or legal foundations. 142 In
actual practice, it appears that court ordered obstetrical intervention is
not predicated upon a true maternal-fetal conflict. Rather, it denotes a
maternal-physician conflict where there was a problem in communication,
no true informed consent, and a one sided imposition of the physician's
will.143 Thus, the approach to obstetrical care was the decisive factor in
these interventions.
The most often cited case with the most appealing set of facts for com-
pelling cesarian section, Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hospital
Authority,144 illustrates the iatrogenic nature of this issue. 145 A woman
at thirty-nine weeks gestation was diagnosed with a placenta previa, a
condition where the placenta blocks the birth canal and can cause fatal
hemorrhage when labor starts. The physicians argued that there was a
99% chance that the baby would die and a 50% chance that the mother
would die if vaginal delivery were permitted. 146 The patient refused the
surgery on religious grounds. 14 7 The court held that the fetus was a human
being and that the rights of the patient were "outweighed by the duty of
the state, to protect a living, unborn human being from meeting his or
her death, before being given the opportunity to live.' 14 Subsequently,
the patient had an uneventful vaginal delivery. Apparently, "mother na-
ture" reversed the Georgia Supreme Courts decision on appeal. Shortly
after the court upheld the order, ultasonography studies revealed the
placenta "shifted".149 In fact, placentas do not shift in their position.
Clearly, the diagnosis was entirely erroneous. The characterization of
maternal-physician conflicts as maternal-fetal ones, in this context, is
clearly illegitimate.
The physician-patient relationship, through the therapeutic alliance of
the doctrine of informed consent, can achieve truly shared decision-mak-
ing in obstetrics. 1 0 It would require physicians to understand their biases,
1421n Re A.C., 539 A.2d 203 (D.C.App. 1987). One of the earliest cases involving
enforced care was Raliegh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42
N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (the state interest in
the life of the fetus justified a blood transfusion for the mother who objected on
religious grounds; since it was impractical to separate the mother from the fetus,
the court ordered the transfusion). It should be noted that the patient left the
hospital and was never forced to do anything.
"41 Kolder, et al., supra note 14 at 1192.
1" 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981)(per curiam).
145 "latrogenic" means caused by the doctor.
- See Id.
1
4Id. at 86, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
148 Id. at 89, 274 S.E.2d at 460.
149 Kolder, et al., supra note 141, at 1192.
- See Informed Consent, supra note 14. Rhoden's perspective on the likelihood
that such decision-making will occur is grim. However, the author has been
pleasantly surprised that not only is it possible, it actually takes very little effort
to achieve the required open-ended dialogue. This is especially surprising given
the nature of this obstetrical practice: a county institution with 3500 deliveries
per year, 95% of the population is indigent of which a large proportion is semi-
literate, and a substantial percentage are adolescents.
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enter into open-ended dialogues with their patients, and share the un-
certainties of the proposed care and outcome. An exploration of the pa-
tient's values must take place early in pregnancy before emergency
decisions are necessary so that serious conflicts may warrant a change
in the physician.'5' This is important because in cases of apparent irrec-
oncilable conflict, the patient is in an extremely vulnerable position as
she is often without benefit of counsel, and judges are inclined to distrust
patients and uphold medical opinion. 15 2 Given the problem of uncertainty,
there appears to be no legal or ethical duty to ask the courts to replace
informed consent with enforced acquiescence. 153
The medical-ethical strategy in maternal-physician conflicts involves
a balancing test which sets forth three conditions for intervention: the
fetus is at great risk of harm, the treatment is a great benefit for the
fetus, and the risk of treatment to mother and fetus is low."5 However,
in the recent reversal of the court ordered cesarian section in In re A.C.,"'
the lower court judge was admonished for his engaging in a balancing
exercise, weighing the interests of the woman against those of the fetus.5 6
This is because the primacy of the woman's rights is supported in the
common law and the Constitution. 157 The ethical approach still pits the
physician's evaluation against two factors, uncertainty and his patient's
concernslMs Although the ethical balancing of risks appears attractive
and arguably may reduce uncertainty, it still fosters the uneasy alliance
of physician and state against the patient. 159
One area where ethical balancing tests and court involvement may be
appropriate is in the care and delivery of brain-dead pregnant patients.'6
"I Chervenak & McCullough, supra note 44; Informed Consent, supra note 14,
at 84.
152 Informed Consent, supra note 14, at 86.
-" Chervenak & McCullough, Perinatal Ethics: A Practical Method of Analysis
of Obligations to Mother and Fetus, 66 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 442 (1985).
- Elkins, Court ordered Cesarian Section: An Analysis of Ethical Concerns in
Compelling Cases, 161 A. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 150 (1989). The problems inherent
with this balancing approach lie in defining a standard of harm. The uncertainties
encountered in these situations pose a substantial risk of arbitrary and capricious
interpretation, a risk of unequal treatment in similar medical situations, and
difficulty with the definition of an acceptable level of risk of harm to the mother.
'5' In Re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990).
15 Curran, Court Ordered Cesarian Sections Receive Judical Defeat, 323 N.
ENG. J. MED. 489, 491 (1990). The majority noted that if the patient were incom-
petent, the judge's duty would have been to inquire into what the patient would
have wanted. He was only to investigate her past conduct and personal values
to obtain evidence of her desires. Id.
157 Id.
158 A basic principle in bioethical decision-making is that the degree of auton-
omy operating is directly proportionate to the degree of uncertainty involved.
159 Annas, Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients, 316 N. ENG. J. MED. 1213
(1987).
'6 Field, Gates, Creasy, Jonsen & Laros, Maternal Brain Death During Preg-
nancy: Medical an Ethical Issues, 260 J.A.M.A. 816 (1988).
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In one such case, the husband requested a court order to sustain his wife's
life long enough to perform a cesarian section to save the baby. 61 The
order was necessary to supersede the wishes of the patient's family, and
a child was successfully delivered at seven and one half months of preg-
nancy.162 But here, there was no issue of maternal-fetal conflict.
16 3
B. Abortion as a Maternal-Fetal Conflict
At first thought, there can be no doubt that the decision to abort a
pregnancy represents an ultimate issue in terms of a maternal-fetal con-
flict. However, when the process of abortion is placed into the entire
perspective of pregnancy, labor, childbirth and parenthood, it would ap-
pear that the risks of the former are substantially less than the risks and
the burdens of the latter.'6 Actually, abortion occurs very commonly in
nature. For every one thousand women with fertile ova who are exposed
to normal sperm, one hundred and sixty ova will not fertilize, one hundred
and fifty will fertilize but fail to cleave (divide), three hundred and twenty
pregnancies will abort at the time of the expected menses, twenty-nine
will abort by six weeks, seventeen will abort by ten weeks, eight will
abort by twenty weeks, and six fetuses will die after viability but before
birth (stillborn).165 By far, the major causes of fetal wastage are genetic.'6
161 See Comment, Legal Representation of a Fetus: The Mother and Child Di-
sunion? 18 CAP. U. L. REv. 591, 598 (1989) [hereinafter Comment, Legal Repre-
sentative]. The comment describes the case of Poole v. Santa Clara County Kaiser
Hospital, unreported, 604575, (Sup. Ct., Santa Clara Co., Calif. 1986).
162 See Comment, Legal Representation, supra note 161.
163However, if an otherwise competent woman, clearly and convincingly, elu-
cidates her desire not to have life prolonging precedures applied, even in the
presence of pregnancy, then the recent Cruzan decision may control to forbid a
court order for life prolongation and cesarian section. This would square with In
Re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App. 1990), which determined that a terminally ill
patient who is pregnant with a viable fetus has the right to decide what will be
done with the fetus.
- See Beacham, supra note 84.
165 W. DROEGEMULLER, A. HERBST, D. MISHELL, JR. & M. STERCHEVER, COM-
PREHENSIVE GYNECOLOGY 376 (1987). Human reproduction is not very efficient,
that is, fetal wastage is 69%. In addition, the 31% of liveborns include prematures
(7%) and congenital anomalies (3%). If the state passes a law that states human
life begins at conception and such an unborn child has interests in life, health,
and well being that are capable of being protected, then physicians may be re-
quired to prevent a miscarriage where the fetus is most likely chromosomally
abnormal or environmentally damaged. This requirement would conflict with the
current standard of care for patients that are threatening to miscarry. A tragic
example of this thinking occurred in the early 1950's when pregnant women were
treated with the medication, diethylstibesterol (DES) to prevent spontaneous
abortion. DES had no effect on the abortion rate but did, in fact, cause permanent
harm to those fetuses that were otherwise normal. See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W. 2d 37 (1984). See also Linn, Lieberman, Schoenbaum,
Monson, Stubblefield & Ryan, Adverse Outcomes of Pregnancy in Women Exposed
to Diethylstilbesterol in Utero, 33 J. REPRO. MED. 3 (1988).
16 W. DROGEMULLER, et al., supra note 165 at 378. If the body would naturally
reject an abnormal fetus, then should not the person be able to reject an abnormal
fetus that slipped by the body's defenses, so to speak?
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Abortion does very little to disrupt the physical status quo of the woman
while her entire life is changed via a pregnancy. In this context, pregnancy
may represent a far greater source of maternal-fetal conflict.
The role of the physician in this issue is to be the patient's advocate,
provide informed consent, and participate in the decision-making proc-
ess.167 The informed consent process would include a discussion of the
risks, benefits and burdens of abortion, the alternatives to abortion, and
the patient's right to an abortion as an alternative to pregnancy.' 68 The
discussion should take place at preconceptual counselling or at the first
prenatal visit. The failure to do so may invoke a malpractice claim for
lack of informed consent, wrongful birth or wrongful life.' 69 Withholding
abortion as an alternative to pregnancy may also result in a charge of
deception.1
70
There is an area of abortion where the issue of maternal-fetal conflict
is particularly interesting. In multifetal pregnancy, that is, twins or more,
the incidence of preterm labor increases substantially. In infertility sit-
uations, the drugs to induce ovulation often stimulate multiple eggs with
the result of four, five or six embryos eventually transferred to the mother.
In the situation of quadruplets or greater, whether naturally occurring
or as a result of infertility treatment, the likelihood that all the fetuses
will survive intact is low. Thus, within the standard of medical care, the
patient is given the option of selective termination to reduce the number
of embryos, to a number where the likelihood of normal survival is high.'
17
167 See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
168 Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 412 N.W.2d 232 (1987) (as long as
abortion remains an option allowed by law, a physician owes a duty to furnish
parents with adequate information for them to decide whether to choose that
course of action.)
169 See Devries & Rifkin, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Wrongful Preg-
nancy: Judicial Divergence in Birth Related Torts, 20 THE FORUM 209 (1985);
Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Coun-
seling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REv. 713 (1982). The courts have generally
recognized the parents' claim for damages when the doctor negligently performs
genetic tests and a genetically abnornmal baby is born - wrongful birth. Only
three jurisdictions have recognized a fetus' "right" to such a claim, contingent on
livebirth - wrongful life. See generally Curlender v. Bio. Science Laboratories,
Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 320, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 613 P. 2d 954 (1982); 106
Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal.Rptr. 477 (1980); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 478
A. 2d 755 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 656 P. 2d 483
(1983).
170 See Mother & Unborn Baby Care of N. Texas Inc., v. Texas, 749 S.W. 2d
533 (Tex. Ct. App., 1988), reh'g denied, 109 S. Ct. 2431 (1989) (anti-abortion group
and its principal were guilty of violating Deceptive Trade Practices Act; adver-
tisement for abortion services actually resulted in showing women anti-abortion
materials and films of graphic scenes and pictures pertaining to abortion).
171 Berkowitz, Lynch, Chitkara, Wilkins, Mehalek & Alvarez, Selective Re-
duction of Multifetal Pregnancies in the First Trimester, 318 N. ENG. J. MED. 1043
(1988). Evans, Selective First Trimester Termination in Octuplet and Quadruplet
Pregnancies: Clinical and Ethical Issues, 71 OBSTET. GYNECOL. 289 (1988).
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In this situation the maternal-fetal conflict focuses on how many embryos
to carry. The ethical "consensus" has been to reduce the multifetal ges-
tation to two. This preserves the conception as multifetal and also allows
the patient to have two children, in the event that this may be her only
chance to have any children.
172
To summarize, the physician-patient relationship is the fundamental
element in the decision-making process in abortion. The characterization
of this decision as a maternal-fetal conflict, however, is ingenuous, es-
pecially in light of the enormous consequences embodied in carrying a
pregnancy to term.
C. Employment in the Toxic Workplace
Many analogies can be drawn between the physician-patient relation-
ship and the employer-employee one. Thus, it is a useful tool for analyzing
the problems in the hazardous workplace. The analogy to the duty to
provide informed consent in the physician-patient relationship is over-
whelming. There is also an analogous fiduciary relationship when the
employer is privy to information about hazardous employment. In the
employer-employee relationship, the onus of duty is on the employer to
state the conditions that exist in the workplace and the risks that such
conditions pose. It should be the employee's decision to take the risks. 173
Why should the level of self determination be different in the workplace
than it would be regarding health care? By similar analogy, the char-
acterization of maternal-fetal conflict to the issues involved in the haz-
ardous workplace is also misbegotten because it clouds the real issue -
an employer-employee conflict.
The central issue in this perplexing area is whether a ban of fertile
women from employment entailing exposure to substances that may cause
birth defects in dangerous sex discrimination or appropriate business
policy for high risk enterprises with open-ended tort liability. 7 4 Propo-
nents of "fetal protection" policies indicate that safety in the work place
is paramount, and employers should have the right to transfer any
worker, male or female, from a toxic environment. Opponents note that
an employer's policy of banning fertile women from a toxic workplace,
whether or not they are pregnant, or intend to become so, violates the
1964 Civil Rights Act, barring workplace discrimination against women.
In effect, such a policy may exclude women from twenty million jobs.
Otherwise, women would have to choose between fertility or employ-
ment.
75
"I Generally, this pertains to women whose multifetal pregnancy is a result
of infertility treatment.
173 See Kilborn, Who Decides Who Works at Jobs Imperiling Fetuses? N.Y.
Times, Sept. 2, 1990, at Y1, col. 1.
174 Presser & Bertin, Women At Work: Should "Fetal Protection" Policies be
Upheld? 76 J.A.B.A. 38 (1990).
1
7 5 Id. at 39.
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The case that has centralized these issues, International Union, UAW
v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,7 6 involves employment bans against women in
the battery manufacturing business. The court, sitting en banc, held seven
to four, that available scientific data indicated that the risk of transmis-
sion of harm to a fetus as a result of exposure to lead is substantially
confined to fertile females and that the employer's policy was based on
real differences between men and women relating to child bearing ca-
pacity which is consistent with Title VII. 177 Apparently, the court, in
Johnson Controls, ignored the inconvenient data on the health risks to
male workers in their decision.178
The physician's role in this debate is to fairly state the risks involved.
Essentially, there are two problems with the medical data regarding
environmental risks in the workplace. First, the data comes from epi-
demiological research and, by its very nature, this type of data cannot
determine which particular event was a substantial factor or the cause
in fact of a particular person's disease. 179 Consistent with this principle
is the fact that no one has been able to show any harm to the offspring
of women who worked at Johnson Controls during their pregnancies.
Second, the data about environmental pollution and pregnancy reveals
V6 886 F. 2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
177 Id. at 886. This court followed the recommendations of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency responsible for administering
Title VII. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Statement on Re-
productive and Fetal Hazards Under Title VII, (October 3, 1988)(found in Fair
Employment Practice Manual (BNA) 401:6013). See also Becker, From Muller v.
Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. Cmi. L. REV. 1219 (1986); Comment,
Fetal Protection Programs Under Title VII - Rebutting the Procreation Presump-
tion, 46 U. PriT. L. REV. 755 (1985).
I" The majority apparently relied on the outmoded theory that males do not
need protection because the fertilization process weeded out defective sperm; those
that were damaged would not fertilize. However, recent data contradicts this
theory. Since the sperm "turn over" in their production relatively rapidly, they
are very sensitive to environmental toxins. Welch, Schrader, Turner & Cullen,
Effects of Exposure to Ethylene Glycol Ethers on Shipyard Painters. II. Male Re-
production, 14 A. J. INDUS. MED. 509 (1988). "Safe" male workers should have
included only those who do not produce sperm, either by disease or vasectomy.
The only real difference between men and women, in this environment, is that
women who are too old to procreate, those aged 50-65, could continue to work.
This does not apply to males since it is well established that men can sire children
well beyond their retirement years.
1'9 JohnsonControls, Inc., 886 F. 2d at 875. See also Novick, Use of Epidemi-
ologic Studies to Prove Legal Causation: Aspirin and Reye's Syndrome, A Case
in Point, 22 TORT & INS. L. J. 536 (1987); Dore, A Commentary on the Use of
Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARv. ENV'L. L.
REV. 429 (1983). However, in Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F. 2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 644 (1988) (an action to recover for leukemia caused by atomic device
testing prior to 1963, the court allowed the use of epidemiologic studies to prove
causation based on public policy grounds and shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant.).
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considerable uncertainties. 18 0 Although the effects of environmental tox-
ins on the male reproductive system have been reported,'" it is only
recently that studies have been published which link sperm damage to
children's disabilities . 2 For example, it is more likely that damaged
sperm may cause fetal damage because the ovary is less sensitive to lower
levels of toxic exposure than sperm production. 18 3
The characterization of the issues affecting women in potentially haz-
ardous employment as a maternal-fetal conflict is truly a misnomer. In
this respect, it is as illegitimate as the portrayal of maternal-physician
conflicts as maternal-fetal ones. A more appropriate representation, from
the medical perspective, would be gender neutral and focus on occupa-
tional safety.
D. Criminalization of Maternal Conduct
Your local district attorney comes to you, as chief of your obstetrical unit,
with a proposal. She explains that there is an epidemic of drug use in the
community, and she is pledged to combat it. She acknowledges that per-
forming routine drug screens prenatally may drive people away from seek-
ing prenatal care. Thus, she wants you to obtain drug screens on all cord
blood samples taken at delivery8 4 so that she may use those samples that
test positive for controlled substances to coerce the respective patients into
drug rehabilitation programs. She argues, quite persuasively, that this
represents a medical benefit for the patient. When asked if she would
prosecute a woman for murder if her child subsequently dies and the cord
blood sample tested positive for a controlled substance, she replies in the
affirmative.
180 Longo, Environmental Pollution and Pregnancy: Risks and Uncertainties for
the Fetus and Infant, 137 A. J. OBSTET. GYNECOL. 162 (1980). Malchol, Environ-
mental Hazards: What They'll Mean To Your Patients In The 1980s, 15 CONTEMP.
OB/GYN. 22 (1980). Environmental toxins generally comprise two major areas:
carcinogens-agents that cause cancer, and teratogens-agents that cause genetic
abnormalities, mutations, defects and abortions. Lead is a particularly well known
teratogen which has been linked to sterility, spontaneous abortion, stillbirth, birth
defects, prematurity, and chromosomal abnormalities. Id. at 32.
,81 Machol, supra note 180, at 37.
182 See Scripps Howard News Service, Studies Link Sperm Damage to Children's
Disabilities, Indianapolis Star, Aug. 18, 1990, at B6, col. 2. This account reveals
the difficulty that authors of such studies encountered. Although the data linking
sperm damage to disability was buried in the scientific literature, publishers were
reluctant to print these reports. This is contrary to biologic fact, that is, a well
established principle in animal husbandry is that "[i]f you had a bull in a field
full of cows and something was wrong with the calves, you would look at the
bull." Id.
183 Id. The epidemiologic studies in nuclear plants reveal that even low levels
of radiation exposure were linked to an increase in leukemia in male worker's
offspring. See also Rowley, Leach, Warner & Heller, Effect of Graded Doses of
Ionizing Radiation on the Human Testis, 59 RADIAT. REs. 665 (1974).
8 At each delivery, the standard of care requires that a sample of the blood
from the umbilical cord be taken and tested for blood count, blood type, Rh factor,
and a screen for antibodies that may cause jaundice in the newborn. In most
states, at 48 hours of life, a blood sample is taken from each newborn to test for
metabolic diseases, such as phenylketonuria and thyroid disease.
[Vol. 5:1
MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICTS
This scenario is being played and replayed in medical centers through-
out the country. Some hospital clinics are routinely testing for drugs at
the first prenatal visit, without the patient's consent or knowledge of such
testing. Those that test positive are "channeled" into social service con-
sultations designed to direct the patients into drug treatment programs;
some are directed to the local district attorney.185 Other clinics, interested
in epidemiological research, are testing with consent and judicial writs
of confidentiality. 86 Still, others are testing under state laws which man-
date the reporting of births to mothers who used drugs or alcohol during
pregnancy. 817 All of this has been under the rubric that maternal conduct
during labor, potentially harmful to the fetus, should be prosecuted and
result in punitive sanctions.
The war on drugs has extended to a war on pregnancy. "The nation's
legal system has begun to take drastic measures aimed at making preg-
nant women legally accountable for the fetuses they carry."'18 The basic
principle espoused by the state to achieve this accountability is that fetal
abuse is tantamount to child abuse which would require the immediate
removal of an infant from the mother. Since there are no fetal abuse
statutes, prosecutors have applied existing statutes to address this issue,
either those that prohibit child abuse and neglect or those that prohibit
the delivery of a controlled substance to a minor.8 9
The fetal abuse-child abuse polemic is the crucial argument used to
justify state intervention in maternal conduct. The argument is attrac-
tive. Since parents cannot violate their duty to care for their children,
even at the expense of personal religious value, then mothers should not
be able to refuse care necessary for the fetus. 90 This is the prenatal
equivalent of child neglect or abuse. However, lurking beneath the facade
of this argument are insidious and alarming implications. "Fetal neglect"
implies that there is some legally cognizable duty to the fetus.'8 ' Although
a child is a "person" physically separate from its mother, the fetus is
inseparably tied to its mother and is not a "person" as used in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 192 Thus, what the state must do to end "fetal neglect"
- physically invade the maternal barrier - is entirely different than what
15 See Hoffman, Pregnant, Addicted - And Guilty? New York Times Magazine,
Sun., Aug. 19, 1990 at 32.
186 Frank, Zuckerman, Amaro, Abagye, Bauchner, Cabral, Fried, Hingson,
Kayne, Levensoh, Parker, Reece & Vinci, Cocaine Use During Pregnancy: Prev-
alence and Correlates, 82 PEDS. 888 (1988).
187 Chasnoff, Landress & Barrett, The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use
During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County,
Florida, 322 N. ENG. J. MED. 1202 (1990).
189 Sherman, Keeping Baby Safe From Mom, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 3, 1988, at 1, col.
1.
'8' See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
'
9 Rhoden, Cesareans and Samaritans, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 118, 120
(Fall 1987).
1' Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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it may do to end child neglect. 193 The analogy drawn between the two
issues is erroneous. 9
4
Compelling parents to provide medical care for their children does not
involve the same issues as enforced fetal treatment. Thus, use of the child
abuse laws to compel such treatment is entirely irrelevant. These laws
severely threaten the physician-patient relationship and may promote
fetal injury through noncompliance by pregnant women who are fearful
of prosecution. Physicians should refuse to support such statutes because
they create a genuine conflict of interest between the doctor's duty to care
and prevent injustice and the status of the physician's license. Moreover,
these statutes represent an impermissible legislative intrusion into the
traditional medical decision-making process. They achieve no benefit
other than to promote political agendas, fulfill quotas, and advance the
careers of the prosecutors who will vow to enforce these statutes, most
earnestly, before election time. The reasoned solution to promote fetal
health and the future of our society is to increase funding and promote
education for accessible prenatal care.
The threshold question for a punitive approach for undesired maternal
conduct is defined by the right upon which the state seeks to infringe. 195
There are two possibilities. First, there may be a maternal right to privacy
which grants autonomy to the woman to make all relevant lifestyle de-
cisions during pregnancy.196 Fetal protection advocates hold that the right
to privacy, which is broad enough to embody the right to procreate, is
distinct from freedom in procreation. 197 They utilize the "waiver" argu-
ment, that is, once a woman waives her right to abortion, she should not
take any action to abuse the fetus. 99 But this argument fails fundamen-
tally because it cannot be tailored narrowly enough to specifically define
abusive conduct.
The second possibility is for the state to enact a narrowly tailored
statute prohibiting a right to use drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. This
would not involve a fundamental right protected for other citizens. It may
pass constitutional muster because illegal use of controlled substances,
cocaine, for example, would not implicate a fundamental right of the
mother. Here, the state interest is strong compared to a vague notion of
preventing "fetal abuse" as it bears a strong relation to the harm it seeks
to prevent, and there may be no other lesser alternative. 99
193 Rhoden, supra note 190, at 120.
194 Id.
191 Note, Developments, supra note 5, at 1580.
196 Annas, The Impact of Medical Technology on the Pregnant Woman's Right
to Privacy, 13 A. J. L. & MED. 213, 227 88).
197 Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv. 405, 410 (1983).
118 Id. at 437.
19 Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminal-
ization of "Fetal Abuse", 101 HARv. L. REv. 994, 1007 (1988).
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However, permissible laws criminalizing maternal conduct, that is,
those that apply sanctions after delivery for prenatal substance abuse,
eventually become counterproductive. They are merely punitive and
achieve no reasonable hope of deterrence of this type of conduct. Although
one may argue that women choose to take drugs and alcohol, no one
chooses to become an addict or alcoholic. It is a well known phenomenon
that pregnant drug addicts avoid prenatal care for fear of prosecution.20°
Conversely, when offered the chance of detoxification, "no questions
asked," drug abuse programs rapidly become overwhelmed. Similarly,
such laws tend to divert attention away from developing the very pro-
grams of medical care most effective in correcting illicit maternal conduct.
A strong therapeutic alliance exists between the pregnant patient and
her physician, and this relationship should be utilized thoroughly in treat-
ing maternal substance abuse.
A more recent governmental approach to the problem of substance
abuse in pregnancy is mandated prenatal drug screening. Without a rea-
sonable basis of probable cause that a specific pregnant woman is violating
the law, this is a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee
against intrusive search and seizure. The only ethically permissible basis
for such screening without the patient's consent is to perform it as an
epidemiological study, preserving confidentiality at all times. This pre-
serves the physician-patient relationship and engenders the promotion
of healthy behavior.
Schemes that would utilize blood tested at the time of delivery to coerce
women into drug rehabilitation sound like they may be of medical benefit,
but they are inherently unethical. They merely document the presence
of a drug at the end of a pregnancy and uphold the spurious argument
that the mother was delivering drugs to a minor.201 More importantly,
mandated testing schemes draw attention away from the help that needs
to be offered earlier in the pregnancy, or even preconceptually, to prevent
the drug from causing damage at a time when the fetus is most suscep-
tible. But most distressing is the bias that occurs when doctors and the
state form an alliance in mandated drug testing and reporting. African-
Americans and the poor are unfairly singled out in drug arrests of preg-
nant women.202 This bias cuts at one of the fundamental tenets of the
200 Field, Controlling the Women to Protect the Fetus, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CAm 114, 121 (1989).
21 Criminal sanctions applied to pregnant women who use controlled sub-
stances on the basis of "delivering drugs to a minor" essentially apply laws to
pregnant women which are intended for drug dealers.
202 Roberts, The Bias in Drug Arrests of Pregnant Women, N.Y. Times, Aug.
11, 1990, at A17, col. 2. It was noted in a study of pregnant women in Pinellas
County, Florida, that the reason African-American women are the primary tar-
gets of prosecutors is not because they are more guilty of drug abuse, but, rather
because of the underlying racism inherent in our society. Chasnoff, et al., supra
note 187, at 1202. In this study, wealthy white women were found to use harmful
substances as frequently as blacks and the poor. The main difference was that
whites tended to abuse alcohol and mood altering pills more frequently than
cocaine, while the reverse was true for blacks. However, when it came to reporting
those suspected of drug use, the doctors in Pinellas County singled out black
women ten times more often than whites. American College of Obstetrics and
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physician-patient relationship, that is, the duty of care also includes a
duty to prevent injustice. As the authors of the Pinellas County study
concluded, "[i]f legally mandated reporting is to be free of racial or eco-
nomic bias, it must be based on objective medical criteria.."20 3
Physicians generally disagree with the punitive approach to stemming
drug abuse during pregnancy.2 4 "We need to treat the problem, not hide
it in. prison.' '20 5 Criminalization singles out pregnant drug users and pen-
alizes them more heavily than others. "If you honestly believe that women
should be criminalized for possibly harming their fetuses, then you will
have to do it for all reasons, not just drugs. '20 6 Laws on fetal abuse erode
the trust developed in the physician-patient relationship and deter pre-
natal care.20 7 Hence, the overwhelming reason health providers oppose
such policies is that they drive away those who are in the greatest need
of help.
V. CONCLUSION
The physician-patient relationship is a remarkable piece of work. It
has evolved into a "Magna Carta" of sorts, establishing the fundamental
principles of mutual duties, rights, autonomy and beneficence within the
context of providing health care, especially to women. It has achieved
constitutionally protected status. It is at once an ethical, moral, legal and
social doctrine that applies equally to all people of all persuasion in all
lands. The principles embodied in the physician-patient relationship es-
tablish the role of the physician which is to render care, be an informed
educator and advocate, participate in the decision-making process and
protect against injustice, while realizing that tests, judgments and de-
cisions are fallible. A serious examination of the concept of maternal-
fetal conflict form the perspective of the doctor-patient relationship re-
veals that this concept is insidiously misleading. If focuses guilt on the
outcome of pregnancy to women alone. The characterization of disagree-
ment regarding the nature of obstetrical care as a maternal-fetal conflict
is improper when it truly is one of physician-patient conflict.
Gynecology, Few Stereotypes Can Be Drawn of the Pregnant Substance Abuser,
34 ACOG Newletter 5 (Aug. 1990). This article very adroitly characerized the
racism encountered in Dr. ChasnofT's study as the "Not in My Office Syndrome."
3 Chasnoff, et al., supra note 187, at 1202. See generally Roland & Volpe,
Effect of Maternal Cocaine Use on the Fetus and Newborn: Review of the Literature,
15 PEDIATR. NEUROSCI. 88 (1989); Howard & Hill, Drugs in Pregnancy, 34 OBSTET.
GYNECOL. SURV. 643 (1979). The singling out of crack (cocaine) users for prose-
cution cannot be justified by either the number of abusers or the degree of harm
to the fetus. Although cocaine is definitely harmful to the mother and fetus, there
is no empirical evidence to suggest that it is more so than excessive alcohol or
nicotine use.
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Many Disagree with the
Punitive Approach to Stemming Drug Abuse During Pregnancy, 34 ACOG News-
letter 1 (May 1990). This article reveals an excellent summary of state action
related to drug use during pregnancy. Id. at 11.
5 Id. The quote is attributed to Mary Jo O'Sullivan, M.D., Secretary, American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology.
Id. The medical profession echoes the legal critics regarding this issue.
7 See Laws on Fetal Abuse Expected to Erode Trust in MDs and Deter Prenatal
Care, Ob. Gyn. News, Feb. 15-28, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
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